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Abstract
This thesis studies the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of constitutional
personhood and its historical lack of clarity and uniformity. I focus on three groups of persons
who historically and frequently bring claims of constitutional protection before the Court: aliens,
children, and felons. Across these three classes of claimants, case analysis shows that the Court
lacks a clear framework for answering questions of constitutional personhood, instead relying on
an individualistic approach in their decision-making, rendering a defined understanding of
constitutional personhood impossible. I argue that the Court’s current methods of decisionmaking produce inequality and second-class citizenship, and further, that it is necessary for the
Supreme Court to adopt a defined approach to constitutional personhood claims moving forward.
Constitutional law and the Supreme Court’s future decisions will become increasingly
convoluted and baseless without modification to their individualized approach.
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Introduction
Even though the issue of constitutional personhood is almost always a foundational
component of the cases brought before the Supreme Court, the Court has never directly answered
the question: who is considered a “person” for the purposes of constitutional rights? 1 Instead, the
Court has treated each claim differently, evaluating on a case-by-case basis who should be
granted the protections of the Constitution.2 In doing so, the Court has effectively created a sort
of second-class personhood, a category for those “non-persons” who cannot easily receive
constitutional protections. The Court continually interprets the Constitution as granting rights to
some and not others, even though the majority of the rights outlined therein are by nature
inclusive, referencing “people,” or in some cases, “citizens.”3 The Court’s fluid, inconsistent
jurisprudence regarding constitutional personhood makes it nearly impossible for some persons
to know whether or not a claim brought before the Court for constitutional protections will be
affirmed or dismissed, and it presents new challenges for the Supreme Court looking ahead to
future jurisprudence. Additionally, the Court’s lack of clear answers on constitutional personhood
raises more questions about the scope of rights in the United States: Why are corporations
1

Bravo, Karen E. “On Making Persons: Legal Constructions of Personhood and Their Nexus with Human
Trafficking.” North Illinois University Law Review (2011). https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860219. Bravo’s article
identifies and analyzes the role of law in constructing personhood, and her research further applies that construction
of personhood to the construction of human trafficking. Her research extends well beyond the study of human
trafficking, however, to include how constructions of personhood apply to children, legal immigrants, undocumented
migrants, and ex-convicts, among others. She further explores how legal literature has left personhood largely
unexplained and begins to shed light on the implications of such a system.
2 Robinson, Zoë. “Constitutional Personhood.” The George Washington Law Review Vol. 84, No. 3 (May 2016):
605-667. http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/84-Geo.-Was.-L.-Rev.-605.pdf. Robinson’s work takes
the issue of constitutional personhood and explores it as it relates to corporations, aliens, and felons, highlighting the
need for a specific future approach by the Supreme Court in these cases. She argues that there is a deep need for
reform in the Court’s handling of constitutional personhood claims and she advocates for a defined approach moving
forward. Her work takes into consideration a variety of cases and examines the constitutional theory behind each
decision.
3 U.S. Constitution preamble. (“[w]e the People”); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“the People”); id. amend. I (“right of the
people”); id. amend. II (same); id. amend. IV (same); id. amend. IX (“the people”); id. amend. X (same); id. amend.
XVII (same).
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protected by the First Amendment, but some individuals are not? Why are some aliens
considered constitutional persons, but others are not? Why do felons in some states permanently
have their voting rights stripped away, even after completing their full sentence?
In an increasingly complex and changing world, constitutional personhood claims will
also necessarily become increasingly complex and more frequent. Following President Trump’s
Executive Order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” in
January 2017, local courts across the United States began (and continue) to field questions from
those individuals concerned about their status as constitutional persons.4 However, in an
American judicial system where the Supreme Court has routinely heard similar questions and yet
has not developed a clear, uniform method of evaluating these claims, it becomes simple to
divide the polity into classes: those protected by the Constitution, and those whose constitutional
status is still undetermined. Indeed, the Supreme Court is routinely asked to decide a person’s
constitutional status, and analysis of the Court’s decisions in the past highlights the need for a
more defined, more transparent understanding of personhood as intended in the Constitution.
This thesis functions as a window into the history of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process in cases involving three separate groups of claimants who have historically
fallen into the category of second-class citizenship created by the Court: aliens, children, and
felons. All of these groups have seen constitutional personhood claims upheld and dismissed,
with no clear reasoning provided by the Court other than a case-by-case, situational balancing act
of constitutional rights. Since the Court has yet to acknowledge a “coherent body of doctrine or

4

EXECUTIVE ORDER: PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE
UNITED STATES. January 27, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-orderprotecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states.
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jurisprudential theory” on constitutional personhood, it is unclear who is entitled to bring claims
of constitutional protection before the Court. The Court will continually leave some, as Robinson
explains, “relegated to the sidelines of the Constitution.” 5 Moreover, this thesis works to
understand the question of constitutional personhood as it exists for different groups of people in
the United States and show how the Supreme Court’s approach to the question of constitutional
personhood is flawed, inconsistent, and in dire need of reform. Aliens, children, and felons
represent a broader problem inherent in the Court’s application of constitutional rights and this
thesis seeks to understand the nature of constitutional personhood as interpreted by the Court, as
outlined in the Constitution, and as an essential component of the future of American
jurisprudence.
In the first chapter, I examine competing understandings of personhood in existing
literature, focusing particularly on the the language of the Constitution and how it has been
subsequently interpreted by the Court through history. Understanding the legal implications and
varied interpretations of personhood serves as a foundation for the following chapters, in which I
study a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, first involving nonresidents, or aliens,
and then residents, namely children and felons, and then look ahead to the future of
constitutional personhood cases. Case studies and analysis of the Court’s handling of each case
underscore the convoluted nature of the Court’s decision-making process and demand that the
Court address constitutional personhood claims more directly in the future.
5

Fagundes, Dave. “Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction.”
Harvard Law Review Vol. 114, No. 6 (2001). https://ssrn.com/abstract=921133. See also, Robinson, “Constitutional
Personhood,” p. 609. Dave Fagundes takes on the task of exploring personhood as it exists under the law, and he
relies on three substantive areas (corporations, American slavery, and fetal homicide statutes) and highlights how
legal personhood interpretations play (or played, in the case of slavery) a significant role in each. He further argues
that those varying interpretations can have detrimental social implications for the entity subject to diminished legal
standing as a “person.”
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In practice, the Court’s acknowledgment (or lack thereof) of personhood status can have
detrimental impact to those communities seeking personhood and constitutional protections, and
this thesis seeks to shed light on the impact of the Court’s inconsistent decision-making in a real,
personal way. Research into the history of constitutional personhood in a variety of contexts
necessarily raises questions about those whom it directly affects: What are the negative societal
impacts if felons permanently lose the right to vote? How do cases involving the constitutional
personhood of aliens affect immigration and immigration policy? While the scope of this thesis
is limited and focuses primarily on understanding the Court’s historical interpretation of
constitutional personhood, analysis of a variety of cases over time becomes necessary to
understand the ways in which the Court’s reasoning has historically been flawed and the ways in
which constitutional personhood serves as an important foundation for those second-class
citizens moving forward.
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Chapter I: Interpretations of Personhood
How do courts understand the legal nature of personhood? In order to understand the
many ways in which the Supreme Court has interpreted constitutional personhood, it is necessary
to examine “constitutional personhood” as a term in all of its legal complexity. Political scientist
Alexander Wendt argues that there are different types of persons: psychological persons, that
“possess certain mental or cognitive attributes,” legal persons, that “have rights and obligations
in a community of law,” and moral persons, that “are accountable for actions under a moral
code.”6 Common notions of “personhood” largely involve equating “person” with “human
being,” but Wendt’s legal definition of “person” as a subject of law and community is the
foundation for understanding constitutional personhood as interpreted by the courts. Legal
personhood, then, has little to do with one’s physical condition as a human, but everything to do
with legal recognition.7
As such, the language of the Constitution invests some protections explicitly to specific
groups while others are left largely open to interpretation. At its broadest, the Constitution
protects “the people” or “the People,” and a “Person” or “Persons,” with these references
appearing twenty-two times throughout the body of the Constitution, four times in the Bill of
Rights, and twenty-three more times in the Amendments.8 Additionally, some rights outlined in
the Constitution extend specifically to the “Citizen” or “Citizens,” or even the “natural born

6

Wendt, Alexander. “The State as Person in International Theory.” Review of International Studies Vol. 30 (2004).
http://kittenboo.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/published/5-wendt.pdf. Wendt’s article focuses largely on
international theory and personhood, claiming that, in the field of international relations and political science,
scholars often describe nations as “actors” or “persons,” and in doing so, prescribe them the same qualities as human
beings. Wendt further highlights the attributes that should be attributed to both states and human beings, and his
definitions of “personhood” have translated easily into other fields, such as law, philosophy, and sciences.
7 See Robinson, “Constitutional Personhood.”
8 U.S. Constitution. Preamble–Article VII.
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Citizen.”9 Some subsequent rights-based Amendments limit constitutional protection to citizens
only (i.e. the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
in respect to voting rights). Sometimes, as Robinson notes, constitutional rights are even further
limited a specific group of constitutional persons. For example, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
“speedy and public trial” specifically protects “the Accused,” making the protections of the Sixth
Amendment applicable in a specific, defined situation.10 Similarly, the First Amendment includes
protections for “the Press” and Article III offers rights for “the Owner” in prohibiting the
quartering of soldiers without the owner’s consent.11 However, not all constitutional protections
are as explicitly understood; some constitutional rights remain ambiguous, leaving the persons
who can claim their protections open to interpretation. Naturally, then, the Constitution limits
who (or what) can claim constitutional personhood and its protections and leaves the question of
constitutional personhood begging to be answered. Indeed, “every constitutional claim requires
not only that someone violate a constitutional restriction, but also that the person bringing the
claim is constitutionally empowered to vindicate that violation.” 12
Thus, the question of constitutional personhood necessarily serves as a foundation of
every constitutional claim brought before the Court. Although the scope of this thesis does not
include in-depth analysis of corporate personhood cases, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010 and the more recent Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby in 2014 are important to understanding the fluid nature of constitutional personhood as

9

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XI; id. amend. XIV, §
1; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“the accused”). See also Robinson, “Constitutional Personhood,” 615.
11 See id. amend. III (“the owner”).
12 See Robinson, “Constitutional Personhood,” 617.

Jennings !7
interpreted by the Court.13 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the
government could not constitutionally restrict independent political expenditures by a nonprofit
corporation. Here, the Court extended First Amendment freedom of speech protections to
corporations, and the principles articulated by the Court in Citizens United have since been
applied to for-profit corporations, labor unions, and other associations. In extending First
Amendment rights to corporations, the Court effectively argued for a broad interpretation of
constitutional personhood, arguing that corporations are “people” for the purposes of certain
rights. This controversial decision necessarily complicates the question of constitutional
personhood for the modern Court, and without a clear definition in use, personhood remains
ambiguous.
In deciding Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court primarily determined whether the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) exempts from the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
contraception mandate those companies whose owners oppose the contraception on religious
grounds. RFRA states that “[the] Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise
of religion,” thus making the central issue before the Court one of constitutional personhood.14
In upholding the religious freedom of Burwell, Justice Alito in the majority opinion explained
that “no conceivable definition of [‘person’] includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations,
but not for-profit corporations,” effectively expanding Court’s understanding of constitutional
personhood and holding to a definition of “personhood” outlined in the Dictionary Act of 1871.15

13

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___
(2014).
14 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993), codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (also known as RFRA).
15 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014).
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The Dictionary Act of 1871 instructs courts to apply all federal statutes definitions of certain
common words, including “person,” and basic rules of grammatical construction “unless context
indicates otherwise.” 16 Further, the Act states that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals.” Courts have taken the Dictionary Act and applied it inconsistently since it
was created, with some courts hardly referencing it at all to others employing it as a guide;
however, recent Supreme Court cases about the personhood of corporations take the Act’s
definition of “personhood” and apply it broadly, extending to corporations the same
constitutional protections as individuals.
This broad understanding of “person” spills over into cases across the board and
perpetuates the inconsistency in the Court’s interpretations of constitutional personhood, but this
interpretation of personhood is not new. Columbia law professor John Coffee explains that
corporate entities date all the way back to medieval times, explaining that “the Catholic Church
[was] probably the first entity that could buy and sell property in its own name.” 17 Indeed, the
legal personhood of a corporation “would allow people to put property into a collective
ownership that could be held with perpetual existence,” allowing those rights to extend beyond
one person’s lifespan or inheritance. 18 Beyond the medieval age, corporate protections were the
backbone of economic development in the United States and elsewhere; however, corporations

16

1 U.S.C. § 1. Congress updated the Dictionary Act most recently in 2002. See Born-Alive Infants Protection Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2012)) (defining “born alive”).
17 Totenberg, Nina. "When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal Evolution." NPR. July 28, 2014.
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution.
Totenberg focuses on corporations in her analysis of constitutional personhood, but her analysis serves this thesis by
examining the evolution of the legal system, arguing that it has become more convoluted and difficult to understand.
Corporations serve as a picture through which the fluidity of constitutional personhood can be viewed.
18 See Totenberg, “When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal Evolution.”
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are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, making the courts responsible for determining
the legal standing of and rights afforded to corporations. Historian Eben Moglen notes that, at the
beginning of the United States, “the only right given to corporations was the right to have their
contracts respected by the government,” but by the 1800s at the dawn of industrialization,
corporations saw a greater need for making money, thus forcing the courts to begin thinking
about the ability of corporations to claim constitutional protections moving forward.19
When corporate lawyers initially started pushing for equal treatment following the
passing of the Fourteenth Amendment, they were not fighting for First Amendment religious and
speech protections like they are in modern America. Rather, they sought equal treatment under
state tax laws and other arenas that would benefit them financially. Over time, the Supreme
Court has extended more and more rights to corporations out of the Bill of Rights, including the
protection against unwarranted search and seizure; however, corporations were never given any
sort of free speech protections until recently with Citizens United. In fact, in 1907, Congress
passed the Tillman Act, banning corporate involvement in federal election campaigns in the wake
of a corporate corruption scandal involving prior presidential candidates. 20 The Act held as rule
until the 1978 Supreme Court case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, where the Court
held for the first time the corporations have a First Amendment right to spend money on state
ballot initiatives.21 Despite the Bellotti ruling, corporations were still limited in their influence of
federal elections until Citizens United in 2010, which reversed nearly a century of legal
precedent on corporate constitutional personhood and created much of the controversy that still

19

ibid.
The Tillman Act of 1907 (34 Stat. 864) (January 26, 1907).
21 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
20

Jennings !10
pervades modern discussions of personhood. On one side, proponents of the Citizens United
decision explain that nobody is saying that “corporations are living, breathing entities, or that
they have a soul,” but that they are advocating for the protections of the individuals who choose
to associate in that way.22 On the other side, critics of Citizens United argue that individuals can
express their political opinions and donate money freely on their own, that a corporation is not
necessary to facilitate political speech. Historian Eben Moglen again criticizes the Court, arguing
that we are “using constitutional rules to concentrate corporate power in a way that’s dangerous
to democracy.” 23
Understanding the complicated history of corporate personhood and the Court’s
seemingly unprecedented divergence from it highlights the necessity for transparency and reform
in constitutional personhood cases across the board. Indeed, no legal question has sparked more
recent controversy than whether corporations are people, and yet even here, just like in cases
involving aliens, children, and felons, the Court has been inconsistent and unclear.24 In two
recent cases, Horne v. Department of Agriculture in 2013 and City of Los Angeles v. Patel in
2015, the Court upheld certain constitutional rights for the claimants, which were mixtures of
individuals and business associations, yet made no distinction or clarification about whether
corporations should have the same constitutional protections as individuals. In both of these
cases, the Court focused on the nature of the rights in question, not the identity or status of the

22

See Totenberg, “When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal Evolution.”
See Totenberg, “When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal Evolution.”
24 Winkler, Adam and Kent Greenfield. "The U.S. Supreme Court's Cultivation of Corporate Personhood." The
Atlantic. June 24, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/raisins-hotels-corporate-personhoodsupreme-court/396773/. Here, Winkler and Greenfield criticize the Supreme Court for its expansion of personhood
rights to corporations. They focus on two smaller, lesser known cases (Horne v. Department of Agriculture and Los
Angeles v. Patel) to illustrate the far-reaching scope of corporate rights under the Constitution.
23
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claimants.25 Today, as it stands, corporations have seen a dramatic expansion of constitutional
rights, but the Court has never directly addressed whether corporations ought to be entitled to the
same rights as other constitutional persons. Regardless of political opinion about the
constitutional personhood of corporations, the Court has neglected to explain when and why
those rights can be extended to them. This thesis seeks to take the example of the Supreme
Court’s inconsistency and lack of transparency in corporate personhood cases and apply it to
other classes of claimants. Cases of aliens, children, and felons, while not as highly contested or
publicized as cases like Citizens United and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, present the same problems
inherent in the Court’s decision-making and rest on a foundation of inconsistency in
constitutional interpretation.

25

See Winkler, “The U.S. Supreme Court’s Cultivation of Corporate Personhood.”
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Chapter II: Case Studies and Analysis
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s record in dealing with questions of constitutional
personhood allows an unbiased examination of the trends present in their decisions and provides
a foundation for future jurisprudence under more unified, transparent decision-making criteria.
The following case studies serve to paint the larger picture of how the Court has historically dealt
with questions of constitutional personhood in order to begin identifying those trends and aid in
the development of a framework for future cases. While many cases only deal with constitutional
personhood in part, the Court has expressly dealt with the issue of constitutional personhood at
least twice, first in 1857 with Dred Scott v. Sandford and again in 1973 with Roe v. Wade. In
Dred Scott, the Court addressed whether or not Scott, or any black person, had the right to sue in
federal court, and the Court held that blacks could never be citizens of the United States, nor
could they ever be “member[s] of the political community formed and brought into existence by
the Constitution…and…entitled to all the rights…guaranteed by that instrument.”26 In his
opinion, Chief Justice Roger Taney explained that
…[blacks] are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
“citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. 27
Indeed, Taney’s decision highlights the Court’s belief that blacks, by virtue of the color of their
skin, were so far inferior to white citizens that they possessed no rights and no protections under
the Constitution. The Court’s decision in 1857 with Dred Scott v. Sandford expressly addressed
26
27

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857): 403.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857): 405-06.
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the question of constitutional personhood in the majority’s claim that black men were a
“subordinate and inferior class of beings,” thereby limiting federal citizenship to effectively
apply only to white men.28
Decades later in Roe v. Wade, the State of Texas claimed that a fetus is a “person” for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.29 Thus, in their decision, the
Court necessarily engaged the question of constitutional personhood as it applied to unborn
babies. In doing so, they counted the number of times the word “person” appears in the
Constitution, with specific argument that “in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is
such that it has application only postnatally,” leading the Court to hold that the term “person”
constitutionally does not include the fetus.30 Unlike Dred Scott v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade
where the Court fleshed out the question of constitutional personhood and provided an express
interpretation, most cases are much more complicated and convoluted. Indeed, while the Court
decided relatively clearly in 1857 that black people were not considered “people” for
constitutional purposes, and in 1973 that unborn children were not “people” either, the scope and
nature of constitutional personhood claims has always been broad and diverse, particularly in
cases involving alien claimants, felon claimants, and increasingly, children. Since the Court
rarely deals with the question of constitutional personhood explicitly, an analysis of the Court’s
jurisprudence and a chart of the trajectory of those decisions becomes necessary to understand
how constitutional personhood has evolved, and thus how it can be codified in the future.

28

The Court’s ruling in Dred Scott was effectively overturned with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868; however, Dred Scott v. Sandford still remains as a moment in the history of the Court where constitutional
personhood was addressed directly, and denied for the claimant.
29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): 157.
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A. Aliens
The question of constitutional personhood for aliens—both within and outside the United
States, documented and undocumented—has taken center stage in modern American politics.
Indeed, in the wake of President Trump’s controversial immigration ban and as thousands of
undocumented persons and unaccompanied minors continue to cross into the United States from
Latin America, the lower courts are continually being asked to determine what, if any, rights
these persons have under the U.S. Constitution. 31 Immigration scholar Linda Bosniak looks at the
Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence and notes that while the Court has never
withdrawn personhood in its entirety, they have repeatedly “diminished [personhood] in its
effect, evaded, effaced, diluted, displaced.” She further argues that “[dilution] is the real risk to
constitutional personhood for non-citizens and for some citizens, as well…not outright removal
but depreciation.”32 The Supreme Court has yet to establish a uniform definition for alien
constitutional personhood claims; however, in a significant number of cases, as Bosniak
explains, the rulings have involved a watered-down version of personhood. As a result, this
dilution of constitutional personhood has created multiple sets of constitutional rights, where the
only difference between the rights is a difference in their scope.33 The question, then, has
31

Chokshi, Niraj. "More than 30,000 undocumented kids have been released to sponsors in every state." The
Washington Post. July 25, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/25/more-than-30000undocumented-kids-have-been-released-to-sponsors-in-every-state/?utm_term=.6f765abd725d. See also, Brody,
Rachel. "Should Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Be Sent Home?" U.S. News and World Report. July 7, 2014.
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/07/07/should-undocumented-immigrant-children-be-sent-homefrom-the-border. Chokshi and Brody highlight the spike in recent years of undocumented children coming into the
United States, focusing on the impact of that increased immigration to American politics.
32 Bosniak, Linda S. “Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought.” International Journal of Constitutional Law
Vol. 8, No. 1 (2010): 9-29. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1578394. Bosniak’s article poses the idea that “citizenship and
personhood are opposing concepts,” arguing that personhood should not be considered the basis for constitutional
subject status because of the multiplicity of questions it raises rather than answers. Her work is critical of the idea of
constitutional personhood and explains that the concept “promises much more than it can deliver.”
33 Houlgate, Laurence D. “Three Concepts of Children’s Constitutional Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment
Theory.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 77, No. 2 (1999). http://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol2/iss1/3/.
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become, “What are the criteria for deciding whether a given class of persons should have rights
of the same or of a different scope from persons of another group or class?”34
The 1886 Supreme Court case Yick Wo v. Hopkins was the first case where the Court held
that a law could be race-neutral on its face, but administered in a prejudicial manner, which then
became a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 Following
the rise of Chinese immigration to California beginning in 1850, tensions with Americans grew,
culminating in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The Act was the first of many pieces of
legislation directed at preventing Chinese immigrants from entering the United States, and
California’s implementation of the Act involved requiring Chinese immigrants to obtain certain
permits in order to work, which proved to be impossible, and prevented Chinese immigrants
from gaining citizenship through naturalization. 36 As a result of the severe work regulations in
California, many immigrants began to operate laundry facilities; however, in 1880, San
Francisco passed an ordinance requiring those people operating laundry facilities in wooden
buildings to obtain a permit. Only one permit out of two hundred was granted to a Chineseoperated laundry facility, while nearly every other non-Chinese applicant received a permit
without issue. Yick Wo, a laundry facility owned by the Chinese immigrant Sang Lee, continued
in operation, and as a result, Lee was fined ten dollars for violating the San Francisco ordinance.
Sang Lee sued for a writ of habeas corpus after imprisonment following refusal to pay the fine.37
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the application of the San Francisco statute
in question was discriminatory despite being race-neutral on its face. The Court further explained
34

See Robinson, “Constitutional Personhood.”
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that, even though most of the Chinese immigrants who were impacted by the ordinance were not
American citizens, they were still entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Matthews’ opinion, he denounced the law as a “blatant attempt to exclude Chinese from the
laundry trade in San Francisco,” and, as a result, struck down the law and dismissed all charges
against other laundry owners who had been targeted.38 Interestingly, the precedent established by
Yick Wo v. Hopkins had little standing moving forward in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding
discriminatory laws; indeed, Yick Wo was never applied to Jim Crow laws in the South, and the
Court seemed to disregard it entirely when developing the “separate but equal” doctrine in Plessy
v. Ferguson only ten years later. Not until the 1950s did the Warren Court use the principle
established in Yick Wo to strike down attempts by southern states to prevent the political
participation of blacks.39
Ten years after Yick Wo, the claimant in Wong Wing v. United States argued that the
statute that required aliens who were unlawfully present in the United States to be “imprisoned at
hard labor for a period not exceeding one year” violated provisions of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, and the Court agreed. In 1892, Wong Wing and three others were sentenced to
hard labor at the Detroit House of Labor and deportation under the Chinese Exclusion Act.40 The
Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution do not allow
“imprisonment at hard labor” for non-citizens convicted of illegal entry to or presence in the
United States without a jury trial. The Court further voided the imprisonment provisions of the
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Chinese Exclusion Act, thereby establishing that non-citizens subject to criminal proceedings are
entitled to the same constitutional protections as citizens. The Court, using principles established
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, explained that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to “all persons
within the territory of the United States…even aliens…” 41 Additionally, the Court has since
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes, in the
cases of alien defendants, “the right to be informed of the immigration-related consequences of
entering a guilty plea,” making the case for equal constitutional footing regardless of alienage
status.42
However, the Court has not always taken the side of the claimant seeking constitutional
personhood and protection. In the 1943 case Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court held that the
application of curfews against a specific group of people was constitutional when the United
States was at war with the country from which that group originated.43 Following Executive
Order 9066 (which came as a response to the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor), President Roosevelt
authorized military commanders to subject Japanese Americans to curfew before eventually
being moved into internment camps. Gordon Hirabayashi, convicted of violating the curfew,
appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Court upheld the curfew order. Interestingly, the Court
recognized in the Hirabayashi case that “distinctions between citizens solely based because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality,” and yet still upheld the conviction of Hirabayashi and the
enforcement of discriminatory curfew and internment laws. Here, the Court acknowledged the
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law’s creation of a distinction between persons, even realizing the dangers such a division poses
to a nation like the United States. Yet, they refused to rule in a way that abolished that distinction
or made the law more transparent.
Aside from a few outliers in the late 1800’s like Yick Wo and Wong Wing, the Court’s
jurisprudence historically has treated alien constitutional personhood claims individualistically,
allowing claims from some persons while diluting those of others based on circumstance or
status. The Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager decided that U.S. courts
had no jurisdiction over German war criminals held in a U.S.-administered prison in Germany. In
May 1945, the German High Command surrendered, thereby ending the European Theater of
World War II; however, German prisoners detained in China by an American military
commission were convicted of violating the laws of war by continuing to engage in military
activity following the surrender of Germany. The prisoners claimed that their trial, conviction,
and imprisonment in an American-occupied part of Germany violated Articles I and III, the Fifth
Amendment, and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, laws of the United States, and
provisions laid out at the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. government argued that the prisoners,
as non-resident enemy aliens in wartime, had no access to U.S. courts. Further, they argued that
the prisoners had no right to a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. court, and that the Constitution did
not grant protection from military trial and punishment to an alien enemy in the service of a
government at war with the United States.44
In their ruling, the Supreme Court held that extraterrestrial, non-resident aliens were not
classified as constitutional “persons” for the purposes of Fifth Amendment rights and
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protections, specifically because the prisoners had “no territorial connection to the United States”
and that they were “alien enemies.” 45 Moreover, the Court underscored that the claimants were
not denied constitutional protections simply because of their status as aliens, but rather that it
was their combination of alienage status and enemy status during a time of war that rendered
them unable to claim the protections of the Fifth Amendment. 46 Additionally, the Court noted
that aliens are “accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as [they] increase [their]
identity with [American] society,” thereby establishing the necessity of participation in a political
community as a foundation for constitutional protection.47 The Court wrote that “even by the
most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout
the civilized world between citizens and aliens,” and further explained that “if the [Fifth]
Amendment invest[ed] enemy aliens…with immunity from military trial, it [would put] them in
a more protected position than our own soldiers.”48 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager introduced an idea that would govern future alienage constitutional personhood
cases, that a person’s involvement in the political community of the United States (or lack
thereof) could determine his or her eligibility to claim rights protections under the Constitution.
Decades later, when the Supreme Court was asked to address the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause to aliens, the Court held that Fourth Amendment
protections did not apply to searches and seizures by United States agents of property owned by
a non-resident alien in a foreign country.49 The 1990 case United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
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created new questions for future jurisprudence and expanded upon the ideas established in
Johnson v. Eisentrager in 1950. Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen and drug-lord
known to be involved in the 1985 torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar,
was arrested and extradited to the United States. DEA agents received authorization from the
Mexican government to conduct a search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s home, where they found
documents believed to be the defendant's records of his marijuana shipments. However, when the
United States government sought to introduce the records as evidence in court, the defendant
argued that they were obtained without warrant, violating the Fourth Amendment’s protections
against unlawful searches and seizure, and thus could not be allowed in the trial. The Supreme
Court disagreed, ruling that the Fourth Amendment’s protections did not apply where United
States agents searched and seized property located in a foreign country owned by a nonresident
alien in the United States. 50
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion argued that “the people” whom the Fourth Amendment
was intended to protect were “the people of the United States,” and that Verdugo-Urquidez’s
“legal but involuntary presence” on U.S. soil as a result of his arrest failed to create a “sufficient
relationship with the U.S. to allow him to call upon the Constitution for protection.” If there was
a violation of the defendant’s rights, the Court claimed, it had occurred in Mexico, not the United
States.51 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, contending that the framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to apply to any action undertaken by the federal government, thereby
prohibiting any agent of the federal government to conduct a search unless regulated by the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Blackmun also dissented, arguing that when a foreign national is
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charged with a violation of U.S. criminal law, he is being treated as one of the governed. The
multiplicity and diversity of the Justice’s opinions in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez further
established the connected ideas of community and personhood as laid out in Eisentrager years
earlier. Rehnquist’s majority opinion highlights the dilution of constitutional personhood to the
point of creating separate classes of people, in which one group receives the constitutional
protection in question while the other does not. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
“refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community,”
which necessarily raises questions regarding constitutional rights on a broader scale. With this
decision, the Court effectively endorsed a reading of the Constitution in which “the people” can
be interpreted as “members of a political community,” or as “the citizens.”52 United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez further complicated the question of constitutional personhood rather than
clarify it; the Court now had to also consider if the Constitution, under their interpretation,
compelled the reading of “the people” as to mean “the citizens” in practice.
Similarly to aforementioned cases decided during times of war, the Court’s landmark
decision in 2004 in Rasul v. Bush dealt with the constitutional rights of foreign nationals held in
Guantanamo Bay.53 When Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Terrorists on September 14, 2001, President George W. Bush gained broadened powers to
prosecute a “Global War on Terror” in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, and a
couple of months later, Bush signed a military order, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,” which aimed to detain and try enemy combatants
52
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without Congressional oversight or judicial review.54 Rasul, a British citizen captured during the
United States invasion of Afghanistan, was taken to Guantanamo Bay, where he claimed the
Taliban had captured him and forced him to take up arms. The Center for Constitutional Rights
filed a petition in 2004 to challenge the government’s practices in Guantanamo Bay, namely
indefinite detention, refusal of right to counsel, right to trial, or knowledge of charges; later,
Rasul petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to review the legality of his detention. Initially, the
District Court, citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, ruled that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction in
Guantanamo Bay, and that as a result, foreign nationals held there could not be given a trial in
the U.S. Following an appeal, Rasul’s case came before the Supreme Court, where the initial
decision from the District Court was overturned. The Court held that detainees (including foreign
nationals held in Guantanamo Bay) had a statutory right to petition federal courts for habeas
review under the Due Process Clause, marking a divergence from the precedent established in
Johnson v. Eisentrager several decades earlier.55 Thus, the Court’s jurisprudence in cases of
aliens has sometimes supported the constitutional personhood claims of the alien, and other
times, has ruled that the alien has no standing.
Alien constitutional personhood claims are necessarily among the most complicated and
diverse in American jurisprudence, and the Court’s decisions historically rely on a variety of
assumptions and distinctions between groups of claimants. For example, in 1950 with Johnson v.
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Eisentrager, the Court decided to gauge a claimant’s level of involvement with and connection to
his or her “political community” as a means of determining the validity of his or her personhood
claim. As a result, the Court necessarily implied that aliens are excludable from the political
community, and that the states’ governments have a constitutional right to “define” their political
community in that way.56 For the Supreme Court, “a [s]tate’s historical power to exclude aliens
from participation in its democratic political institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s obligation ‘to
preserve the basic conception of a political community.’”57 For the alien claimant in modern
American law, a deep-rooted connection to one’s community has become a necessary precursor
to claiming constitutional personhood and the protections afforded to other classes under the
Constitution. Moving forward, the Court will necessarily be asked to clarify, and likely jettison,
the assumptions upon which their alien constitutional personhood decisions rest.
B. Children
The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 defined “child” as “any human person
who has not reached the age of eighteen years,” and created an outline for those basic rights to be
guaranteed to children, including physical protection, food, education, health care, criminal laws
appropriate for the age and development of the child, equal protection of civil rights, and
freedom from discrimination. 58 For decades, however, interpretations about children’s rights
have vacillated, but as one author explains, “[Children], owing to their particular vulnerability

56

See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973).
Rosberg, Gerald M. “Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?” Michigan Law Review Vol. 75:
1092, 1093, 1135–36 (1977). https://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Rosberg
questions the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction regarding felon voting rights and the ability of the states to decide voting
laws for themselves, explaining his uncertainty about whether or not states can prove a compelling interest in
preventing felons from voting.
58 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/k2crc.htm.
57

Jennings !24
and their significance as the future generation, are entitled to special treatment generally, and, in
situations of danger, to priority in the receipt of assistance and protection.”59 Despite the farreaching scope of the international community’s efforts to guarantee rights for children, by law,
children do not have autonomy and are unable to make decisions for themselves in any
jurisdiction anywhere in the world.60 The movement for children’s rights has necessarily raised
questions about the ways in which adults abuse and exploit children, often resulting in poverty,
poor education, and child labor.61
In the same way that the constitutional personhood of aliens is unclear, so is the
constitutional personhood of children. Cases involving children highlight the historical conflict
between constitutional rights and the desire of the government to shield children from harm. 62
The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of parents
to direct the upbringing and education of their children, but the individual rights of children have
yet to be addressed directly. 63 In order to accurately assess the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
cases regarding children moving forward, it is essential to understand the caselaw established by
In re Gault in 1967 and the doctrine in loco parentis. In 1967, the Court held that juveniles
accused of crimes must be afforded the same due process rights as adults guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, including the right to timely notification of the charges, the right to confront
witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.64 In June 1964, a sheriff
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in Arizona arrested then fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault without notifying his parents following a
complaint from Gault’s neighbor, Ora Cook, about receiving an inappropriate phone call. Gault
was taken to the Children’s Detention Home where he claimed that his friend, not he, had made
the phone call to Ora Cook. Despite this explanation, Gault remained in custody for several more
days, and upon his release, his mother received what would be the only notification of the date
and time for “further hearings on Gerald’s delinquency,” where the judge would sentence him to
the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by the due
process of law.”65 However, if Gault had been convicted as an adult, the punishment would have
been far less severe: a maximum prison sentence of two months and a fine of no more than $50.
At Gault’s trial, Ora Cook, his accuser, was not present. The Court made no transcript of
the hearings and the witnesses who testified were not sworn. Since Arizona law in the 1960’s did
not allow for appeals in juvenile cases, Gault’s parents submitted a petition to the Arizona
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. After the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed their
petition, they appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the Arizona Juvenile
Code that had convicted Gault was unconstitutional because it (a) did not require that either the
accused or his parents be notified of the specific charges against him; (b) did not require that the
parents be given notice of hearings; and (c) allowed no appeal. Moreover, they argued that the
Juvenile Court’s handling of Gault’s hearing constituted a denial of Gault’s due process rights.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the Gaults and held almost unanimously that Gault’s
sentence to the State Industrial School was a violation of the Sixth Amendment since he had been
denied the right to an attorney, had not been notified formally of the charges brought against him,

65

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Jennings !26
had not been informed of his right against self-incrimination, and was not given the opportunity
to confront Ora Cook, his accuser. In re Gault important because it highlights the differences
between children and adults under the law and illustrates how the Supreme Court has, in some
instances, supported the rights of minors.
Moreover, the doctrine in loco parentis, which translates from Latin to mean “in the place
of a parent,” references the legal responsibility of a person or organization to assume some of the
functions of a parent, particularly educational institutions or non-biological parents. In the case
of schools, in loco parentis allows colleges and schools to act in the best interests of the students
as they see fit, except where such action is deemed to violate the students’ civil liberties. Before
the Elementary Education Act of 1870, the English school Cheadle Hulme School, which was
established as a school to educate and care for orphans, adopted in loco parentis as its motto,
marking the first time the expression was used with legal standing in the educational field. 66 The
first major limitation to this doctrine in the United States came in 1943 with the Supreme Court
case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the Court ruled that students
cannot be forced to salute the American flag at school.67 In modern America, in loco parentis
applies primarily to primary and secondary educational institutions rather than colleges and
universities, largely due to the decision in the 1961 case Dixon v. Alabama.68 Here, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Alabama State College could not expel
students without due process, summarily ending the influence of in loco parentis on college
campuses.
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Many of the cases brought before the Supreme Court regarding the constitutional
personhood and subsequent protections of children involve their status as students. In 1969,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District defined the constitutional rights of
students in U.S. public schools.69 In 1965, John Tinker (then 15 years old) and his siblings
decided to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War and in support of the
Christmas Truce called for by Senator Robert Kennedy. Before the students could wear the
armbands to school, the principals of the Des Moines schools created a policy that would
penalize children wearing the armbands. When Tinker and his siblings wore the armbands
anyway, they were suspended from school. The Iowa Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU took
suit all the way to the Supreme Court, where the Court held that the school administrators had
not demonstrated a valid reason for this regulation of free speech. Fortas, in his majority
decision, explained that the school “must be able to show that [their] action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Since the school did not provide a compelling reason for
infringing upon the First Amendment rights of its students, the Court found that the wearing of
armbands in protest “did not cause disruption” and that it “represented constitutionally protected
symbolic speech.”70 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was the first
case where the Court established standards for protecting the free speech rights of public school
students, thereby affirming their status as constitutional “persons,” and the Tinker test is still
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used by courts today to determine whether a school's disciplinary actions violate students' First
Amendment rights.71
While the Supreme Court has generally considered children constitutional persons for the
purposes of First Amendment protections, the Court has not always affirmed the constitutional
personhood of children. For example, Ingraham v. Wright upheld the disciplinary corporal
punishment policy of Florida's public schools.72 In 1970, James Ingraham, then in eighth grade,
was accused of failing to promptly leave the stage of the school auditorium when asked to do so
by his teacher. As a result and despite Ingraham’s insistence that the accusation against him was
false, the principal and his assistants held Ingraham down and paddled him several times. The
punishment was so severe that Ingraham suffered a hematoma and was instructed by physicians
to rest at home for nearly two weeks.73 Ingraham and his parents sued the Florida school for
“cruel and unusual punishment,” but lost initially, because the court held that the U.S.
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the corporal
punishment of children in public schools. 74 The Supreme Court declined to consider the
Ingraham’s appeal, and subsequent cases involving substantive due process and corporal
punishment in public schools have yet to offer much protection for students. Here, the Court
addressed constitutional personhood as it relates to students in public schools and the Eighth
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has repeatedly ruled
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in favor of public schools, thereby diminishing the constitutional protections afforded to
students, effectively establishing children as “non-persons” for the purposes of certain rights.
Additionally, the 1985 case New Jersey v. T.L.O. offers another example of the Court’s
diminishing the constitutional personhood of children. 75 The case asked the Court to address the
constitutionality of a search of a public high school student for contraband after she was caught
smoking. A teacher at a high school in New Jersey discovered then freshman T.L.O. and her
friends smoking cigarettes in the school’s restroom. Upon being taken to the principal’s office,
T.L.O. had her purse searched, where the principal found cigarettes, a small amount of
marijuana, rolling papers, and other paraphernalia, in addition to two letters than implicated
T.L.O. in dealing marijuana. She was expelled from the school and fined $1,000 for the dealing
and use of illicit drugs.76 When taken to the Supreme Court, the Court’s decision required
consideration of the balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the school’s interest in
maintaining order and discipline; the Court ultimately held that the school had “reasonable
suspicion” to search T.L.O.’s purse, and that the drug-related evidence was in “plain view”
during the search, which serves as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Interestingly, in his concurrence, Justices Powell and O’Connor argued that in
addition to the majority opinion, they believed that “students in primary and secondary
educational settings should not be afforded the same level of protection for search and seizures as
adults and juveniles in non-school settings.”
In 2009, the Court held in Safford Unified School District v. Redding that a strip search
of a middle schooler violated the Fourth Amendment where the school lacked reasonable
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suspicion for the search. 77 Officials at Safford Middle School in Arizona received a report that
13-year-old Savana Redding provided prescription-strength ibuprofen and naproxen to a
classmate. As a result, they searched her belongings and, having believed that Redding might
have hidden contraband under her clothing, had her strip to her underwear, “pull her bra out to
the side and shake it,” and “pull out the elastic on her underpants.” During the search, the
officials found nothing and neglected to contact Redding’s parents. Justice Souter, in his majority
opinion, wrote that the strip search did violate Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights, but that the
school officials who had done it were entitled to qualified immunity because the search’s
unconstitutionality was not established at the time of the violation. Here, the Court took a step
towards defining constitutional protections for minors, but still diminished its decision by
granting qualified immunity to the ones who violated the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court’s decisions relating to children (or more specifically, students) in schools
marks an entire area of jurisprudence where the constitutional personhood of the student is
diminished in a way that it otherwise would not be for adults or non-students. The child’s status
as a student, the Court has ruled, is enough to warrant the abridgment of certain rights, much in
the way the Court evaluates and decides cases brought by alien claimants, and as discussed later,
felons. While the Court interprets cases involving schools and students traditionally in favor of
the school, the approach to other cases involving children is different, especially in cases of
abuse. In 1989, the Court held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County that a state government
agency's failure to prevent child abuse by a custodial parent does not violate the child's right to
liberty for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 In 1980, a divorce court had given
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custody of 1-year-old Joshua DeShaney to his father, Randy DeShaney. Three years later,
following a police report of child abuse and a hospital visit, the Department of Social Services
obtained a court order to keep the boy in the hospital’s custody. Three days later, the juvenile
court dismissed the case and returned the boy to his father’s custody. For several years, the
Department of Social Services routinely reported that Randy DeShaney was not complying with
their agreement, and in March of 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that he fell into
a life-threatening coma; brain surgery further revealed hemorrhages caused by “traumatic injury
to the head inflicted over a long period of time.” Joshua lived, but is expected to spend the rest of
his life in an institution for the profoundly retarded. Randy DeShaney was tried and convicted of
child abuse and spent less than two years in prison.
Joshua’s mother filed a lawsuit claiming that by failing to intervene and protect him from
violence about which they knew or should have known, the agency violated Joshua’s right to
liberty without the due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held
that the Department of Social Services’ actions were not found to violate Joshua DeShaney’s due
process rights, explaining that the DSS was not obligated to protect him from harm. In his
dissent, Justice Blackmun famously compared the DeShaney case to Dred Scott, saying that in
both cases, the Court upheld an injustice by choosing a restrictive interpretation of the
Constitution.79 Blackmun’s dissent serves as an important window into the Court’s decisionmaking process; like many dissents, Blackmun explicates the fault of the Court in its
interpretation, comparing it to one of the worst cases in the Court’s history and pointing out the
injustice done in the denial of constitutional personhood rights for Joshua DeShaney.
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While DeShaney did not receive constitutional protections in 1989, the 1944 case Prince
v. Massachusetts shows a time when the Court did uphold the constitutional rights of children. A
Jehovah’s Witness woman, Sarah Prince, was convicted for violating child labor laws for
bringing a 9-year-old girl, Betty Simmons, to preach on the streets downtown. Here, Prince
argued that the state’s child labor laws violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise her
religion and her equal protections rights. In a narrow decision, Justice Rutledge explained that
the government has broad authority to regulate the actions and treatment of children, further
arguing that “parental authority is not absolute” and can be permissibly restricted if doing so is in
the interests of a child’s welfare. He also wrote that while children share many of the same rights
as adults, they face different potential harms from similar activities. Here, the Court took into
consideration Betty Simmons’s status as a child and applied the Constitution in a way that
protected her constitutional personhood, denying Prince’s claim against Massachusetts child
labor laws. The constitutional personhood of children is largely situational as interpreted by the
Court, but generally, the Court has not upheld the constitutional personhood of children aside
from the same protections afforded to adults in court (i.e. right to trial by jury, knowledge of
charges, counsel, etc.). Like aliens and felons, the question of constitutional personhood for
children is still undetermined.
C. Felons
Unlike the cases previously discussed regarding the constitutional personhood of aliens
and children, felon cases typically involve a claimant who previously and unquestionably held a
constitutional right and has since had that right stripped away because of conviction as a felon,
namely the right to vote. Indeed, felony disenfranchisement is relatively common in the United
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States where the laws regarding felons and voting are known as some of the most punitive in the
world.80 In the Second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has routinely
held that the Constitution implicitly permits the states to adopt this type of rule “for participation
in rebellion, or other crime,” leaving felon-citizen voting rights entirely up to the states. While
felons are currently able to vote in most states, some states like Florida, Iowa, and Kentucky
continue to permanently bar those convicted of a felony from voting, and requirements across
other states are varied. For example, some states like Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, and
Nevada permanently disenfranchise some people with criminal convictions, unless the
government approves of individual rights restoration. Other states like Louisiana, Texas, Alaska,
and Georgia restore voting rights to felons upon completion of sentence, including prison, parole,
and probation. Still others like Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and Oregon restore voting rights
automatically after release from prison, and others like Maine and Vermont allow felons to vote
even while they are in prison.81
Every year, millions of American citizens are denied the right to vote due to felony
disenfranchisement, and among those denied the right to vote because of felon-status, people of
color make up an overwhelming majority.82 Indeed, in the United States, punitive felony
disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect black and Hispanic communities where people
are routinely “arrested, convicted, and subsequently denied the right to vote,” with research
80
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showing that, in some minority communities, as much as 10% of the population are unable to
vote as a result of felony disenfranchisement. 83 Indeed, felon disenfranchisement laws have a
long history and are based on the idea that “those who violate society's rules should not be
allowed to help set them.” 84 As Christopher Uggen, professor at the University of Minnesota
explains, “The message that comes across to them is: Yes, you have all the responsibilities of a
citizen now, but you’re basically still a second-class citizen because we are not permitting you to
be engaged in the political process.”85 While many states have changed their laws on felon
voting rights, felons frequently bring claims of constitutional personhood before the Court,
claiming overwhelmingly the right to vote as citizens protected by the Constitution, and the
Court has consistently held that felony disenfranchisement laws do not violate the Constitution.
Felons, then, present the complicated questions of when and why constitutional personhood can
be retroactively removed from a person. One scholar notes that “[t]here are so many
constitutional arguments against the disenfranchisement of felons that one can only wonder at the
survival of the practice.” 86
In 1974, the Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez that convicted felons could be barred
from voting with no violation to the Fourteenth Amendment. 87 A group of convicted felons in
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California who had completed their sentences brought a class action suit against California’s
Secretary of State challenging the state’s constitutional provision that permanently barred anyone
convicted of an “infamous crime” from voting. In most voting rights cases, the state is required
to show that the voting restriction is a necessary component of a “compelling state interest,” and
that the disenfranchisement of felon-citizens is the means to achieve their objectives. Thus, in
Richardson v. Ramirez, the plaintiffs argued that the state of California had no “compelling
interest” in denying them their voting rights, and the California Supreme Court agreed that the
provision was unconstitutional. However, on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state
“does not have to prove that its felony disenfranchisement laws serve a compelling state
interest.”88 In its decision, the Court highlighted Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which
exempts felony voting restrictions from the higher level of scrutiny generally given to cases
involving voting rights restrictions. The Court emphasized the part of Section 2 specifying
“participation in rebellion, or other crime” as a justification to distinguish felony
disenfranchisement from other forms of voting rights infringements, which must be precluded by
a compelling state interest.
While most felon claims brought before the Supreme Court involve restrictions on voting
rights, felons also commonly bring claims of Fourth Amendment protections before the Court,
like in the 2006 case Samson v. California.89 Here, the Court held that suspicion-less searches of
parolees are lawful under California law, and that the search in question was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment because it was not “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”90 The same
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question came to the Supreme Court earlier in United States v. Knights, where the Court also
held that condition of release did not allow a released prisoner the full expectation of privacy
generally afforded to constitutional persons under the Fourth Amendment.91 In Samson v.
California, a police officer witnessed Donald Curtis Samson walking down the street, recognized
him as a parolee and, having heard that Samson “might have a parolee at large warrant,”
proceeded to search Samson due to his status as a parolee. According to California Penal Code,
one of the conditions of parole is the agreement to “search and seizure by a parole officer…at
any time of the night or day, with or without a search warrant or with or without cause.”92 The
officer who searched Samson found a plastic bag with methamphetamine, which led to the arrest
and conviction of Samson for possessing methamphetamine. Despite Samson’s efforts to
suppress the evidence obtained during the suspicion-less search, the jury convicted him and
sentenced him to seven years in prison, with the Court explaining that the search was not
“arbitrary or capricious.”93
In addition to the diminished rights of felons to vote and maintain a certain level of
privacy, felons see a variety of civil rights afforded to Americans without a felony on their record
stripped away or diluted, such as the right to bear arms, and various public social benefits in the
United States. Indeed, most states require firearms dealers to conduct background checks prior to
selling guns, and many states hold bans on felons purchasing or owning firearms, especially
those felons who have been convicted of a violent crime. Additionally, felons are barred from
employment in certain fields by virtue of felon-status, including employment with the U.S.
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Armed Forces, law enforcement, and education, and many other employers still screen applicants
based on prior felony conviction.94 Richardson v. Ramirez, Samson v. California, and the
standing body of state and national disenfranchisement laws represent an area of jurisprudence
where the Court has decided that the constitutional rights of a certain group of persons can be
diluted without violating the Constitution. The contemporary understanding of the right to vote is
that it extends to “citizens,” which means that felon-citizens are regularly disenfranchised.
Indeed, like aliens and children, felons make up a class of persons with diminished constitutional
personhood, and the Supreme Court has yet to define constitutional personhood in a way that
would prevent the constitutional rights of felons from being reduced. As it stands, constitutional
personhood can mean one thing for one person and another thing entirely for someone else.
Analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding these three groups of persons (aliens, children,
felons) offers a clearer picture of how the Court addresses questions of constitutional
personhood. The Supreme Court takes claims of constitutional personhood and protections on a
case-by-case basis, focusing on the nature of the claimant in each case rather than relying on a
unified framework or explicit answer to the question, “What is a constitutional person?”
An alien-claimant’s status as an alien will necessarily impact his or her standing before
the Court, historically resulting in the outright denial or dilution of constitutional protections. A
child-claimant’s success in claiming constitutional personhood necessarily depends on the child’s
age and whether or not the child is bringing suit against his or her school, in which case the
Court historically favors the school above the personhood of the child. A felon-claimant’s
constitutional personhood is perhaps the most unclear; despite status an American citizen, and in
94
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most cases, despite the completion of his or her sentence, parole, and probation, the Court
frequently allows the states to determine for themselves the constitutional personhood of the
felon-citizen. Here, the Court rules that the previous act of committing a crime is sufficient to
take away constitutional protections that had previously been unquestionably held. While this
chapter explicates only a handful of the cases heard by the Supreme Court regarding
constitutional personhood, these case analyses lay the foundation for a future framework and
highlight the urgent need for the Court to develop a unified, transparent framework for future
jurisprudence. More broadly, the claims of aliens, children, and felons demonstrate that the Court
has not yet considered constitutional personhood as a general whole for which a constitutional
framework is required. If the Court continues in its practice of individualized, status-based
analysis of claims, the law and precedent will become increasingly convoluted, baseless, and
impossible to understand as one singular body of law.
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Chapter III: Future Jurisprudence
After studying cases and trends from a variety of Courts and claimants, this chapter seeks
to identify the commonalities that exist between all three classes and begin to understand the
real-world impact of the Court’s disaggregated approach to constitutional personhood claims
before looking ahead to the need for more unified jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s rulings in
alien and immigration cases necessarily have far-reaching impacts for United States immigration
policy and politics. In 2012, former President Barack Obama began working to provide relief and
assistance to undocumented immigrants in the United States. First, he allowed undocumented
immigrants brought into the United States at a young age to apply for temporary reprieve from
deportation.95 Then, in 2014, Obama expanded the policy to include the undocumented parents
of U.S. citizens. Obama’s broad immigration policy would have offered relief to two categories
of aliens: the parents of children who are citizens or legal permanent residents, which comprises
about 3.6 million people, and those immigrants who were brought here illegally as children,
affecting nearly 1.5 million others.96 In a 4-4 ruling in 2016, the Supreme Court (and Mitch
McConnell’s Republican blockade) effectively blocked Obama’s immigration program, and
recent debate about immigration policy highlights the political nature of the constitutional
personhood of non-citizen aliens.
The Obama administration lamented the ruling, claiming that “for more than two decades
now our immigration system…has been broken, and the fact that the Supreme Court wasn't able
95
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to issue a decision…doesn’t just set the system back even further, it takes us further from the
country that we aspire to be.”97 Legal experts and former Obama administration officials
highlight the far-reaching impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling by looking ahead to the potential
shutdown of former President Obama’s original program Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(or DACA).98 The politicization of alien personhood is further understood through President
Trump’s Executive Order temporarily barring immigration from six predominantly Muslim
countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In the flurry of legal challenges that
Trump’s immigration order has faced, plaintiffs claim that the government cannot act arbitrarily
or without supportive evidence, arguing that the government has provided no evidence that
citizens from the targeted countries posed a unique threat to the United States.99 The
politicization of immigration and alien personhood has necessarily been perpetuated by the
Court. With no firm grounds to understand the constitutional personhood of aliens and
immigrants, and no basis on which to determine their constitutional rights, the future of
immigration policy and restrictions on entry to the United States rests in the hands of public
opinion. If the Supreme Court moved away from their claimant-specific approach and adopted a
transparent, universal interpretation of constitutional personhood, immigration policy would
necessarily become more streamlined and less political.
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The constitutional personhood of children is not as political in nature as alien
personhood, but the claimants would still benefit greatly from a unified framework moving
forward. The constitutional rights of children, their parents, and schools are regularly challenged,
and the Supreme Court has yet to provide justification for its unequal treatment of children
seeking constitutional personhood outside of the small existing body of doctrine, including in
loco parentis, which applies or does not apply depending on the institution. Additionally, the
Supreme Court’s continued disenfranchisement of felon-citizens has impacted and will continue
to impact the election process, and likely the results of future elections. The Supreme Court has
provided no justification for the dilution of the rights of former felons, even those who have
successfully completed their sentence, parole, and probation, other than the vested rights of the
states to decide their own voter laws. The impact of the Court’s failure to recognize felons as
constitutional persons, despite their continued status as citizens, has widespread, detrimental
consequences for the democratic process. In the United States, most states prohibit felons from
voting. The only two states that allow it are Maine and Vermont, which also happen to be the two
states with the highest white populations.100 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia allow
parolees to vote, four states allow those on probation to vote, and nineteen states once release is
final. However, twelve states bar felons from voting permanently if they fail to meet certain
requirements, and the people overwhelmingly affected by those laws are minorities. A report
from the Sentencing Project highlights this disproportionate impact, showing that 2.5% of the
voting age population were made ineligible to vote by felon voting laws in 2010, with 28% of all
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those stopped from voting by felon restrictions being African American.101 In numbers, 137,478
of African-Americans in Alabama, 107,758 in Mississippi, and 145,943 in Tennessee are kept
from voting; in Tennessee, over 40% are black, and that percentage is above 50% in Alabama
and Mississippi.102
A study of felon voting patterns from 1972 to 2000 found that, on average, about three
out of four felons who would vote if given the chance would vote for the Democratic nominee
for president.103 In the 2000 presidential race, felon-voters would have doubled Al Gore’s margin
in the national vote and would have had significant ramifications for the state-level vote in
several states, most notably Florida and Virginia, where the election is always competitive and
where some of the most strict felon voting laws still preside. Indeed, in Florida, all ex-felons
must wait at least five years before asking an executive board for the right to vote, and more
violent offenders must wait seven years. Virginia's Republican governor recently loosened its
rules, but all ex-felons must still pay outstanding fines to the courts and some must still wait five
years before re-applying. If felons had been able to vote in the 2000 election (and every other
election for that matter), American history might look different. Al Gore likely would have won
Florida’s Electoral College votes in 2000, thus giving him the election. While several variables
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make it impossible to determine for certain how different the past would look if ex-felons could
vote, laws prohibiting felons and ex-felons from voting have major ramifications for the
democratic process, including the continued disenfranchisement of minorities in the South. The
Supreme Court’s continued protection of states’ rights over the rights of a group of citizens will
necessarily perpetuate a flawed democratic process in which one group of citizens enjoys full
rights by nature of having never committed a crime, and the other group who sees constitutional
protections stripped away because of their status.
Taking into account the real-world, far-reaching consequences of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence regarding constitutional personhood, a unified framework for the future is
necessary to prevent continued disenfranchisement, political confusion, and dilution of
constitutional rights for specific groups of persons. Across all three classes of claimants, the
predominant disconnect in the Court’s decision-making has been a change in initial focus: in
some cases, the Court focuses on the right being claimed rather than the individual claiming it,
and in other cases, the reverse.104 For example, in Richardson v. Ramirez the Court took on the
task of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment before applying it to the felons who were
claiming the Amendment’s protections. The Court engaged in the same analysis for alien cases in
both Wong Wing v. United States and Yick Wo v. Hopkins. However, in other cases like Johnson v.
Eisentrager, the Court denied constitutional personhood based on the claimant’s status as an
enemy and an alien without regard to the nature of the right being claimed. Here, the Court also
superimposed its own idea about territorial connection as a necessary component of personhood
without articulating the constitutional justification for doing so. Felons have also routinely been
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denied constitutional rights based on their status as felons without any consideration of the right
at issue. Over time, the Supreme Court has vacillated in its approach to questions of
constitutional personhood, sometimes regarding the right in question as the foundation, and other
times deferring to the nature of the individual claiming constitutional protection. As Robinson
notes, “this erratic approach indicates the absence of a theoretically unified approach” to those
cases resting on the question of constitutional personhood. 105
In effect, the Court’s approach to constitutional personhood has created different classes
of persons under the Constitution without justification. For constitutional legitimacy and for the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court itself in the future, the Court must adopt an approach that can
be easily understood and referenced for future cases involving constitutional personhood claims.
In the wake of modern decisions like Citizens United and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court will
increasingly face challenges to other constitutional rights violations for a variety of claimants.
Many questions are already being asked of the Court: Do aliens and felons have the right to bear
arms? Do corporations have a right to privacy? To date, the Court has no functional way of
answering these questions and will likely revert to its historical trend of picking either the right
in question or the status of the claimant without justifying the approach. If the Supreme Court
moved to adopt a constitutionally-founded, unified method for determining these questions ahead
of time, the outcome will be less political, more transparent, and will create a precedent for the
future that is less vulnerable to criticism and negative repercussions. Such action would ensure
that any claimant in the future, whether an alien, a corporation, a child, an animal, an artificial
agent, a man, a woman, or even the environment, will be consistently, constitutionally and
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justifiably considered as a constitutional person (or not) based on one system of decisionmaking.
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Conclusion
The question of constitutional personhood is unique because of its lasting relevance. The
historical foundation and the future importance of such claims requires that the Supreme Court
consider it and find innovations in constitutional law to adapt to a changing environment. By
looking at a variety of cases over time and examining how the Court has dealt with questions of
constitutional personhood throughout history, both far-off and modern, the Court’s
inconsistencies are clearly seen. Case studies offer a picture of how the Court’s approach to
determining constitutional personhood is, at best, unclear and, at worst, encouraging of inequity.
A unified approach to these questions moving forward is necessary to stave off illegitimacy and
prevent the rise of more inequality before the law. The Court has historically shown flexibility
when considering questions of constitutional personhood; however, the negative impacts, the
confusion, and the political consequences of that flexibility highlight the need for a concrete,
consistent, and transparent solution for the future. In modern discussions about constitutional
personhood, a legitimate Supreme Court with a functional decision-making rationale is essential
to the continued success of the democratic republic.
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